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Footnotes:
1. "On Abortion: A Lincolnian Position" by George McKenna, Atlantic Monthly, September, 1995
2. See the essay Civil Rights vrs. Social Responsibility elsewhere on this site for a full explanation.
3. Various sources can be found expressing advocacy of positions based on the belief that abortion is unnatural, per se; among these is the Elliot Institute, which focuses on mental and physical post-abortion risks including connections between abortion and breast cancer incidence, complications to subsequent pregnancies, and general women's health concerns. Contrarily, it should be noted that the New England Journal of Medicine reported in 1997 that "induced abortions have no overall effect on the risk of breast cancer," leaving the correlation squarely in the realm of hypothesizing. This conclusion is based on a study conducted by the Department of Epidemiology Research, Danish Epidemiology Science Center, the Danish Cancer Registry, and the National Board of Health (K.H.-L.) comparing the data of 1.5 million women. An addendum, this study found that, if any link exists between abortion and breast cancer, it lies in late-term abortion procedures, although the study was unable to prove this link with any statistical significance. In conclusion, the term 'unnatural' does not qualify a statistically proven value, but aligns with a sentiment that appeals to rationality—as explained, an abortion is not desirable, in-and-of itself. In turn, it is much easier to support that abortion is unnatural than it is to prove that it is unsafe.
The Illumination and Resolution of Abortion: A Lincolnian Approach (page 1 of 4)
Based on George McKenna's non-partisan approach described in his essay, "On Abortion: A Lincolnian Position" published by the Atlantic Monthly in September of 1995, this work takes another look at the concessions those on each side of the ideological divide must make in order to surpass conflict and arrive at a resolution that moves society forward with respect to this damaging issue.
INTRODUCTION
This essay is inspired by George McKenna's work, "On Abortion: A Lincolnian Position," wherein a rational analysis of the abortion issue yields a plan for resolution. In his essay, McKenna applies President Lincoln's approach to the issue of slavery to the contemporary issue of abortion, citing numerous similarities between the way Americans once treated the issue of slavery and the way Americans treat the issue of abortion today.
My position outlined here joins McKenna's on its basic treatment of abortion—to use Lincoln's own words as quoted by McKenna, we must "arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction..."1—but the path my essay treads speaks of abortion as a symptomatic expression of deeper ills, which is somewhat different from McKenna's position. This is the major update McKenna's work receives, adding a symptomatic perspective; and it is extensive in its ethical treatment of most any consideration on both sides of the debate. One should see no bias in this essay, only a rational path through the quagmire.
While this essay accords with McKenna's position of containing abortion but allowing it to persist with the intention of reducing its prevalence, this essay presents a different perspective on how to work on that reduction, as well as an updated explanation of why this is the best plan for progress. Each of these issues within the abortion debate are interconnected; they must compliment one another—that is, remain logically consistent—and I have worked hard to ensure they are, indeed, complimentary.
Unlike McKenna's essay, my position does not address lexicon—the way we talk about abortion. His examination of this matter is cutting and worth reviewing to remind us of the power words have on the way we form moral judgments. My work is less interested in this social aspect of the debate, focusing on what can be clearly illuminated regardless of how it is labeled.
Finally, the issue of civil rights is treated differently in this essay. Less will be explained of the way civil rights has come to function in our democratic society, but enough is explained to help the discourse to a resolution that is clear, objective, and specific.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SYMPTOMS AND CAUSES
Beginning with the most important point: Abortion is a symptom, and as a symptom, whether abortion is universally accepted or universally repelled does not stint the bleeding that forces Americans into the unsavory, seemingly irreconcilable position of its debate. Therefore, beginning a discourse on abortion requires an understanding that our target is not abortion itself, but rather those circumstances that cause abortion.
As a result, it is fundamentally wrong to frame the debate in a civil rights context.
This latter claim requires much unraveling. Thence, we begin by outlining the classical civil rights-based positions in the debate.
We declare an abortion advocate permits abortions for women according to a natural measure of personal freedom inherent in the American understanding of civil rights. And we declare an anti-abortion advocate recalls a moral obligation, confirming abortion is morally wrong and, therefore, should not be condoned by public policy. The former is termed, "the woman's right to chose," and the latter is termed, "the right to life." Now, we set to work.
The confrontation between abortion advocates and anti-abortion advocates fits the form of a civil rights position I have formerly described as the concept of civil rights versus social responsibility.2 In this position, I suggest that the concept of civil rights sparks natural controversy because the constitution of the United States makes valid civil rights claims in circumstances where they may contradict each other, but without any provision for weighing the value of one or the other competing right. This is exactly the situation that frames the abortion debate.
My approach to such situations is to enter the notion of responsibility into the conflict. Thence, my aim is to temper conflict caused by competing civil rights claims by seeking the greatest degree of responsible action.
So, in light of this approach, I refine my perspective on the abortion debate by asking whether the rights expressed by abortion advocates—the woman's right to chose—should be enforced, or whether, and to what degree, should this civil rights claim be tempered by social responsibility.
The reason I focus on the abortion advocate is derived from the work McKenna accomplished in his essay. McKenna concluded that abortions are inherently undesirable. And this conclusion was formed by looking rationally at the nature of abortions, both physically and psychologically. To paraphrase, the possibility for a woman to use her will to chose abortion seems not a possibility most any woman desires. We may venture so far as to conclude that, given the possibility of abortion is available, such a possibility is not savory regardless of why the possibility occurs—no woman wants to find herself in the position of considering abortion. On this ground, the abortion advocate should not be inclined to promote a policy of abortion on the claim that abortion is itself good; she must concede a bit of ideological ground because the right in which she believes is not inherently, nor thoroughly good.3
In this context, abortion is, at best, an unfortunate remedy. In some sense, abortion is for an unwontedly pregnant woman as chemotherapy is for a cancer patient; it is desired only as a consequence of not wanting to suffer some more unfortunate effect. One certainly does not want to be in the position of opting for chemotherapy, and one also does not want to be in the position of opting for an abortion, one merely wishes that these procedures are available, and remain available.
The purpose for speaking of abortion in this context is to point out that the abortion advocate's civil rights claim is aimed squarely at the right to chose a procedure that is, itself, a remedy. A valid claim cannot be that abortion is a good practice in-and-of itself.
Yet, I also wish to point out that if chemotherapy were to vanish from contemporary society, we might, in this case, be looking at a situation where the root cause that precipitates such remedy has been exterminated. In other words, cure cancer, and the necessity of chemotherapy evaporates.
I contend the same approach to abortion is necessary. When one looks at abortion as a remedy, one must wonder how effective is society at treating the necessity for that remedy. At present—as the debate remains inflamed—we know society is strikingly ineffective.